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Abstract Against the background of the theory of branching space-times (BST),
the paper sketches a concept of individuals. It discusses Kripkean modal intuitions
concerning individuation, and, finally it addresses Lewis’s objections to branching
individuals.
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1 Introduction
Phrases like “a branching object” or “an individual living in branching histories” invari-
ably bring incredulous stares. The phrases evoke an image of one and the same object
miraculously existing in two (or more) alternative possible histories. Since “alterna-
tive” means that the two possible histories cannot both occur, how is it that one and the
same object exists in two (or more) alternative histories? Further incredulous stares
result upon hearing that none of these histories is distinguished as actual. There is
also a philosophical argument, thanks to David Lewis, to the effect that branching
leads to silly consequences: If one construes a modal claim “Humphrey could have
had six fingers on his left hand” in terms of one and the same individual living on two
branching histories, it follows (seemingly) that he has five and six fingers on his left
hand.
In this paper I will argue against those incredulous stares. The rule of this game is
to first acknowledge various controversies concerning objects that are independent of
modeling them in a branching framework. Intuitively, individuals are persons as well
as things (i.e, glasses, planets, bushes, or grains of sand, etc.) The concept is not razor
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sharp: we may have, for instance, doubts about whether ocean waves, neutrinos, or
nations constitute individuals. A different host of problems is brought by biological
organisms like a gigantic fungus or coral polyps or an Argentinian ant mega-col-
ony—cf. Wilson (1999). Next, there is a question of whether individuals can have a
discontinued existence, as stories abound about watches or tents that were first taken
apart and then put together. To finish this list of controversies, since special relativity
makes the spacial size frame relative, there is a problem of squaring a concept of
spatially thick objects with special relativity.
We will not concern ourselves with these controversies. We will rather assume that
there is some concept of individuals before branching enters the stage. We then argue
that first one needs branching individuals and, second, give and discuss a definition
of branching individuals against the background of branching space-times (BST) of
Belnap (1992). Let us, however, begin with a motivating story.
After over four decades of work at the University in Jena, Gottlob Frege retired in
1917 and moved to Bad Kleinen, a small town in Pomerania. The reasons behind this
relocation are not completely clear. On the one hand, incentives in favor of the move
included the rising costs of living and the uncertainty of life in Jena during the First
World War, sentimental family ties to Pomerania, and the peace and quiet and favorable
climate offered by Bad Kleinen—all of which would be important for the frail health
of the Jena philosopher. On the other hand, however, the move meant severing ties
with the university circle and its environs. It also entailed a weakening of contact with
Jena scholars, an end to frequent visits to the university library, and even to a change
in various small but significant rituals (i.e., the afternoon apple strudel at Baumann’s
across from the Paradise station). At first, Frege pushed aside the thought of moving.
It appears that only a visit from a cousin of his mother, Franz Bialloblotzki in the
early spring of 1917 was decisive.1 One should believe that—prior to Bialloblotzki’s
visit—it was really possible for Frege to spend his retirement in Jena. In contrast, in
1917 it was not really possible that Frege would purchase a Trabant some time later
(Trabants were produced in the German Democratic Republic between 1957 and 1991
at the VEB Sachsenring Automobilwerke in Zwickau near Jena).
How are we to think of the real (also known as historical) possibilities which (some)
individuals possess at some instants in time? One should perhaps begin by asking how
individuals should be represented within the framework of a modal discourse. Modal
discourse is studied via modal logic, so it is natural to ask how individuals are rep-
resented therein. Digging into this matter, we very quickly notice that the structures
investigated by the logician are simple in comparison with those required by the meta-
physician. Introducing a set of possible worlds, the logician often writes that it is merely
a set of indices by which he presumably means that possible worlds are simple enti-
ties—i.e., not analyzable further by the logician. In contrast to the logician’s approach,
the possible worlds of the metaphysician are inhabited by events, processes, and indi-
viduals, some of which possess a temporal and/or spatial structure. To the query as
to “how to represent individuals” the modal logician usually responds: “I postulate a
domain of quantification and assume that it comprises individuals”. The second half
1 This story contains some fictitious elements.
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of this answer is, however, controversial at present—for logicians as well. Why should
one assume that individuals are to belong to a domain of the quantification? Instead of
speaking of individuals, we could speak of substances, or just things that exist—here
referring to such a category of objects as exists in the most irreducible manner. Why
then, in the process of building a theory and having some pre-theoretical assumptions
that such-and-such things actually exist, should we have to ensure that these things
belong to the domain of quantification of the theory under construction? In fact, that
this is the way one should work is expressed in Quine’s (1953, p. 13) famous dictum:
“[…] a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound vari-
ables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in
the theory be true.” But, although a burden of proof clearly lies on a proponent of the
above dictum, Quine did not (as far as I know) provide any reasons why this postulate
should be accepted. Moreover, there are formally precise concepts currently present
in logic which do not respect Quine’s requirement.
Permit an illustration drawn from temporal logic and considered in a similar context
by Garson (2006, p. 290). In a temporal logic, temporal slices of individuals belong
to the domain of quantification. Applying Quine’s postulate to temporal logic, we are
thus committed to the existence of temporal slices. Still, looking at this intuitively,
such slices are rather abstract constructions which exist, if at all, thanks to the existence
of the temporal individuals of which they are slices. Temporal slices of a substance
are (arguably) inventions of our mind. In the set theoretical construction of semantic
models for temporal logic, however, temporal slices play a distinctive role for the logi-
cian: they constitute a domain. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they should also
play such a distinctive role in ontology: there are no reasons to accept that elements
of the domain stand for what is truly real.
In contrast to associating substances with elements of the domain of quantification,
one might want to identify substances with some specific functions from the set of
moments to the set of temporal slices, that is, to the domain. Such a function codifies
what the temporal slices of a substance are at any moment in time. This concept is
elaborated in Garson (2006) whose idea of representing substances (individuals) in
modal logic consists in associating some function from set W of possible worlds to
domain D with each substance. Thus, the set of substances is represented by a set I of
some specific functions from W to D (the minimum requirement for specific functions
is that I is not a set of all functions from W to D). Keeping this distinction in mind—
an object is an element of a domain while a substance is a specific function—let us
scrutinize Garson’s argument on behalf of the modal aspect of substances:
A similar argument may be made in the case of the logic of necessity, though
it is bound to be more controversial. If we have to choose between what we
call objects in the semantics, and substances, I would think it is substances that
correspond to what is truly real. In the temporal case, we insisted that real things
have a temporal dimension: they are not mere slices. I think that real things also
have a modal dimension. A real thing would be less real if its possibilities were
not included. A chair is what it is partly because it could not possibly be a desk.
Part of what makes the chair what it is is that it ceases to exist through radical
change (for example, if its wood were used to build a desk). I claim that for
123
26 Synthese (2012) 188:23–39
something to be real, it must have a ‘modal history’ as well as temporal one.
In the same way that certain properties such as changing do not apply to time
slices, the notion of what is possible for a thing does not apply to members of D,
the things we paradoxically call possible objects. The members of D are mod-
ally bare particulars, in the sense that though they may have actual properties, it
makes no sense to talk of what is possible or not possible for them. On the other
hand, the members of I , the substances, have a modal history, which reflects the
nature of things we take to be truly real. (Garson 2006, p. 293)
The argument presented above can be reinforced by pointing not to a chair, but to
things about which we tend to believe that real possibilities stand open before them.
Say, for example, that I am an indeterminist gardener: I believe that at a specific
moment a given tree holds alternative open possibilities. For instance, it could have
pushed out some branches there and then, but this possibility was not realized. Cutting
down an old tree, one could take an interest in its history: when and what happened
in its lifetime? Yet one could pose yet another, more difficult question: when and
what possibilities stood open before this tree? The semantic conception described by
Garson the logician prompts us to formulate an analogous concept of individuals in
ontology. A characteristic trait of these individuals is their many-worldly aspect.
Apart from being interested in alternative possibilities that have been open, or are
now open, or will be open, are there any data that call for a modal concept of individ-
uals? That is, are there some data suggesting that the concept of spatial and temporal
individuals—i.e., persisting in the actual world in space and time—is insufficient? As
a matter of fact, we utter and assert such sentences as “I could have raised my hand
a moment ago, but did not do so”. On the other hand, we are convinced that various
actions could not have really been taken—although perhaps plausibly and consistently
we could think them occurring or even argue that they are not contradictory to the laws
of nature. Further, if we have read something about quantum theory earlier, then we
have statements in our repertoire (which we are apt to accept) such as “This electron
can turn left in the magnetic field, but it could just as easily turn right”. Therefore,
our point of departure is semantic intuition—a tendency to make assertions such as
“It happened this way, but it really could have been otherwise”. In these sentences
we assign real possibilities to concrete items: individuals, events, and processes. Such
data—that is, our inclination to accept statements ascribing real possibilities to con-
crete items—has not been questioned by any school of modal metaphysics.
2 Individuals in Lewis’ theory
I will begin with David Lewis’ popular concept of possible worlds and his conception
of individuals. Putting this most briefly, the Lewisian individual is limited to a single
possible world; it is part of one possible world. At most only a counterpart of a given
individual can be found in other possible worlds, never the exact same individual
(Lewis 1986a, p. 206). This idea can seem radically at odds with the semantic concept
described above according to which individuals possess a many-worldly aspect, at
least in the sense that they are associated with specific functions defined on the set of
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Fig. 1 At the top Lewisian
divergent worlds w1 and w2 are
represented; the lower
rectangles indicate (similar)
initial segments while the
spheres above (in various
patterns) symbolize dissimilar
subsequent segments. Below, the
branching out histories in
branching space-times (BST) are
represented here by the squares
h1 and h2. The unshaded area
indicates where the second
history does not overlap with the
first
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possible worlds. Note, however, that this semantic idea could be realized in various
ways in ontology. Arguably, Lewis realizes this idea when, on the one hand, he asso-
ciates an individual name with its actual bearer in the actual world, as well as, on the
other hand, to the bearer’s counterpart in each possible world (and to the empty set if
a possible world does not contain such a counterpart).
Be that as it may, Lewis’ stance stems from his claim according to which two pos-
sible worlds do not share any parts (their intersection is empty), but can have some
qualitatively similar (with respect to some properties) segments. Two worlds whose
initial segments are qualitatively similar with respect to some specific relations, but
whose subsequent segments are not qualitatively similar with respect to these relations
are labeled “divergent worlds” by Lewis. In contrast to this concept, branching theo-
ries assume that any two possible worlds (known as histories in these theories) have
an intersection which is non-empty (see Fig. 1). The Lewisian point of view leads to
counterintuitive consequences which have been described over the past two decades.
One of the charges pertains to the question of how my counterparts, inhabiting other
possible worlds, are key to my own vacillations, hesitations, worries, etc. which are
expressed in modal language? This is the essence of Kripke (1980) objection leveled
against Lewis (see footnote 13 to Lecture I): on the basis of Lewisian theory, when we
state that Humphrey could have won the presidential elections, then we are speaking of
his counterpart and not Humphrey himself. Illustrating this further, about an hour ago
I was nearly struck by a car. Hence I say, “I could have been run over, but fortunately
I dodged out of the way”. Am I really rejoicing because in another possible world my
twin was run over, but in this one I was saved? Clearly not.2
At least as serious is another allegation regarding the relation between events
and individuals. Lewisian events, especially those among which causal relationships
appear, are many-worldly objects. For example, my morning stumble on the stairs has
its parts in other possible worlds because I could, after all, have stumbled a bit earlier
2 Lewis (1986a) responded to Kripke’s objections, the inadequacy of this reply has been argued for by
McGlone (2008). But for a recent defense of Lewis’s view, cf. Borge (2006).
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or later.3 Presumably we would qualify these cases as a single event (my morning
stumble on the stairs). Yet, paradoxically, my stumbling this morning did not involve
me, but rather my other-worldly clones. The agent of my stumbling is not me as my
stumbling is executed by my counterparts.
At this point, I will interrupt this discourse with Lewis, referring the reader to
Belnap et al. (2001) or Placek (2001). I will return to Lewis in Sect. 2 in order to
respond to his objections against branching histories and branching individuals. In
order to present the latter concept, a bit of information on branching-type theories is
necessary.
3 Individuals in branching-type theories
3.1 Branching theories
The starting point for branching-type theories is an intuition regarding real possibility:
some events have more than one possible continuation. About such an event we may
say (tenselessly) that it faces real alternative future possibilities. Hence the concept of
real possibility is relative to the event itself; with the exception of specific cases, a real
possibility open in one event is not an open possibility in another.4 A set of possible
events, delineating which possibilities are open to which events, is what we call “Our
World”.
Branching theories aim at two goals: to offer a general metaphysical model of our
indeterministic world, as well as to offer a semantics for languages with historical
modalities, tenses, and indexicals. Certain structures in a model of a branching-type
theory are interpreted as a multiplicity of the real possibilities open at an event.5
Branching models, understood as semantic models, assess as true some statements of
the following form:“It is possible that A and it is possible that ¬A” or “Once it was
possible that A, but now it is impossible that A”.
In branching-time (BT) theory, events are understood as momentary time-slices of
the universe. In other words, a BT event is the class of all commonsense point events
simultaneous with a given point event. (This reference to the simultaneity means that
BT is not a relativistic theory). A BT model is a non-empty partially-ordered set of
possible point events, satisfying the requirement of no backward branching. The order-
ing is interpreted as “one event lies in the past of another”. Possible histories (in some
sense reminiscent to the Lewisian possible worlds) are defined as maximal chains in
the base set. In contrast to Lewis, however, BT postulates that the intersection of any
two histories is non-empty. In addition to dealing with events, the theory allows us to
speak of the instants (moments) at which they occur. The first published (informal)
3 I refer here to so-called non-fragile events of Lewis (1986b). Lewis allows for events limited to a single
possible world (so-called fragile), but these are not, according to him, relata of causal relations.
4 In order for this particular case to occur, two events must be upper bounded, be contained within the same
histories, and have the same set of maximal elements.
5 The structures in question are some specific forks composed of maximal chains in a base model, which
Placek and Belnap (2010) called “modal forks”. This publication proves some facts concerning modal forks
as well.
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presentation of this theory is found in Prior (1967). Nonetheless, its unpublished for-
mulation is already found in an earlier (1958) letter from Kripke to Prior. It is, however,
to Thomason (1970) that we owe the formally rigorous presentation of branching-time
theory (for more on this, see Appendix).
In comparison with BT, the branching space-times (BST) theory of Belnap (1992)
permits one to work with the concept of a point event and accommodate some rudi-
ments of special relativity. Further, in contrast to BT, it allows for incomparable events
belonging to one history: neither belongs to the absolute past, or future of the other.
As for a BST model, it is defined as a non-empty partially ordered set of possible point
events which meets certain axioms (listed in Appendix here). The ordering is required
to be dense and is interpreted as “one event lies in a possible future of the other”.
Histories (defined as maximal upward-directed subsets of a base set) are supposed
to be “similar” to Minkowski spacetime. Yet, while histories are isomorphic to Min-
kowski spacetime in some specific BST models known as Minkowskian Branching
Structures and elaborated by Müller (2002); Wron´ski and Placek (2009), and Placek
and Belnap (2010), there are BST models in which this is not true. Two incomparable
events belonging to some single history are said to be space-like related (SLR). It
is postulated that the intersection of any two histories is non-empty. In addition to
events, in some (but not in all) BST models one can define spatiotemporal locations
(geometrical points) at which point events occur (see Appendix).
3.2 Branching individuals
Before embarking on a formulation of the concept of the branching individual, I will
introduce two caveats. Firstly, I will not put forward a sufficient, but rather a necessary
condition—that is, one of the form “If something is an individual, then it possesses
such-and-such traits”. A sufficient condition amounts to a statement of a principle of
individuation, and this is an extraordinarily difficult task. Next I assume a simplifica-
tion according to which individuals are spatially non-extended. It is my belief that this
constraint does not crucially impinge on the following construction. In what follows, I
give a sketch of how to generalize the approach described here to individuals which are
spatially extended as well as to those which alter their spatial extension (thickness)
in time. This requires sharpening of our frequently fuzzy intuitions concerning the
spatial aspects of individuals, which amounts to addressing questions like:
1. Where exactly does my body end in space?
2. Are the empty spaces inside my body part of me?
3. Is my thickness to be understood as frame-dependent, and if so, is there a preferred
frame of reference with respect to which my thickness is to be assessed?
Let us rehearse the required notions—against the background of a nonempty par-
tially ordered set W = 〈W,〉. We write x < y iff x  y and x = y. A chain in W
is a subset of W any two elements of which are comparable by , i.e., I ⊆ W is a
chain iff ∀x, y ∈ I : x  y ∨ y  x . We say that I is a maximal chain in W if for
every B such that I  B ⊆ W, B is not a chain in W . And, if I is a lower and upper
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bounded subset of a maximal chain M that contains all the elements of M between
the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound of I , we say that I is an interval.6
In the definition below, a set A is identified with an individual whereas maximal
chains in A are identified with possible lives of this individual—exactly like in the
postulates 1–4 of Belnap (2011). In contrast to Belnap’s concept, however, we do not
assume that an individual must have a beginning or end to its life, however. We allow
for, say, an elementary particle living for ever.
Definition 1 If A is an individual in a model W = 〈W,〉 of BST, then
1. A ⊆ W ;
2. if x, y ∈ A and x < y, then there is an interval I ⊆ A such that x, y ∈ I ;
3. if x, y ∈ A and x, y ∈ h where h is a history in W , then either x < y or y  x ,
Let us take a closer look at each of the above-listed conditions. The first point
requires that individuals are spatiotemporal in the sense that they are composed of, or
one can differentiate in them, some spatiotemporal events. From a later perspective,
we can say about some individual that some of its/his/her events belonged to once
open real possibilities, which however have not been realized. Thus (saying this again
from a later perspective), an individual consists of what was in its/his/her life, as well
as of what was once possible for it/him/her.
With clause (2) we decided against discontinued existence: the clause is to capture
an intuition that in every possible life of an individual there are no breaks or gaps. This
can be read as a postulate of causal continuity of the stuff constituting an individual:
its later phase is influenced by its earlier phases. Or, assuming that the model permits
the introduction of instants (BT) or spatiotemporal locations (BST), we may read this
condition as: “There are no gaps in the lifetime of the individual” (BT); or “There are
no gaps in the (spatiotemporal) world line of the individual”.
Finally, clause (3) expresses our simplifying premise that individuals are spatially
non-extended. Counterposing the clause, if two incomparable events belong to an
individual, then there is no history to which both of them belong. The clauses of the
definition entail that no history contains two maximal chains in A.7
The simplicity of the above definition may erroneously suggest that this definition
would deliver an adequate concept of individuals if applied against the framework of
branching time. The problem is that in BT an interval is a spatially maximal object—a
segment of history, which makes every individual maximally thick.8
3.3 Individuals in BST
Figure 2 presents two models—upper and lower—each with two histories. In both
of the models, the individual has its beginning in a single spatiotemporal event, and
6 The existence of infima of lower bounded chains and history-relative suprema of upper bounded chains
is guaranteed by BST axioms—see Appendix.
7 For a simplification of this definition I owe thanks to Tomasz Bigaj.
8 I made this error in an earlier version of this paper, and it was pointed to me by N. Belnap and his seminar
group.
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Fig. 2 Individuals in BST.
Above the individual has a
choice; below we see
indeterminism without a choice
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later has two alternative future possibilities. The use of the possessive “has” turns our
attention to the difference between the models, however. In the first one (the upper
one), the choice event e (i.e., the maximal element in the intersection of two histories
h1 ∩ h2) belongs to the individual. Because we have assumed that objects are spa-
tially non-extended, it is natural to conclude that this event represents a choice of our
individual (more precisely, a last event of the individual’s indecision).
In contrast to this situation, the choice event e in the lower model of Fig. 2 is exter-
nal to the individual. This is due to the fact that the part of the individual contained in
the intersection h1 ∩ h2 does not possess a maximal element. Accordingly, there is no
choice event which would belong to this individual.9 This corresponds to the situation
in which a choice event—say the toss of a coin—is space-like related to some part of
the life of the individual. The coin lands either heads or tails and—since both these
possibilities are open in the event of a toss-up—the individual can subsequently live
either in the scenario in which it was tails, or in the scenario in which it was heads.
Since the individual does not have a choice here, although each of the two alternative
scenarios is possible for him/her/it—“indeterminism without choice” is an apt label
for this phenomenon (cf. Belnap 1992).
Let us now look at structures which do not meet the definition of an individual. On
the one hand, the structure contained in the two histories of the upper model of Fig. 3
(and drawn with thick lines) does not fulfill the second clause of our definition as its
life is not continuous; on the other hand, the structure contained in the two histories of
the lower model violates the third clause because it contains incomparable elements
in history h1 (and in history h2 as well).
9 Thanks to clause 4 in definition 4, the subset mentioned does have one supremum in history h1 and a
different supremum in history h2, but does not have a supremum in the model.
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Fig. 3 Two structures, depicted
with thick lines, one in histories
h1, h2 of the top and the other in
the histories h1, h2 of the bottom
model are not BST individuals
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3.4 Additional conditions of individuals
In this section we will discuss some additional conditions that might be added to
the above-described conception of individuals. Thinking over how these conditions
should be formalized, we often discover the multiplicity of their meanings.
To start with, the fact that individual object A must have come into existence is
expressed as follows: each maximal chain in A is lower bounded. This can be fur-
ther refined by requiring that each maximal chain in A has an infimum in A. Clearly,
the meaning of this requirement is that the event of one’s birth belongs to one’s life.
Analogically, one can formulate a thesis that individual A must die some day: each
maximal chain in A is upper bounded, or (more controversially) has a supremum
in A.
More interesting is the matter of representing that which we call Kripkean intu-
itions: we tend to accept that an individual could not have been born to parents other
than those that it really had. Since BST has no machinery to represent an individual’s
parents, we must contend ourselves with analyzing a more sweeping claim: “Indi-
vidual A came into being in such and such a manner and could not have come into
being in any other way”. Many instances of this sweeping claim seem patently false,
however, and likely have not been believed by anyone. For instance, in our traveling
times we seem to believe that we could have been born (or, conceived) in a barely
different place, at another spatiotemporal point, a little bit earlier/later, in a different
event.
It is still worth looking (I believe) at the claim “Individual A came into being
in such and such a manner and could not have come into being in any other way”
from a branching perspective, since this perspective permits us to clearly see that
some intuitions above pertain to events, while others to spatiotemporal structures.
From the event perspective, the fact that A could not have come to be by any other
means can be expressed by saying that A has a minimal element, or (alternatively)
that each maximal chain in A has an infimum in W , and for all maximal chains l1, l2
in A : inf (l1) = inf (l2).
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Moving on to the spatiotemporal perspective, let us recall that the concept “in
the same place” cannot be expressed in BT because this theory overlooks the spatial
aspects of the world. In turn, for relativistic reasons, in BST we cannot express the
concept “in the same time” and “in the same place”. In lieu of this we have in BST the
concept “at the same spatiotemporal location (point)”. The spatiotemporal location of
an event e is then defined as the equivalence class [e]S on a base set with respect to
a certain relation S (see Appendix). The thesis that “A could not happen at another
spatiotemporal location” can be set down as:
Every maximal chain in A ⊆ W has an infimum in W and there exists a certain
spatiotemporal location [e]S to which all of these infima belong.
3.5 A note on spatially extended individuals and relativity
Special relativity entails that an individual’s spatial extension is frame-relative. That
is, “how thick is an individual at a given time?”—receives different answers in differ-
ent frames of reference. One reaction to this observation is to distinguish a particular
frame of reference for a given individual and define the individual’s thickness with
respect to this frame. This could be, for instance, a frame of reference in which an
individual’s center of mass rests. Or, in a similar vein, one may pick some particular
element of an individual (say, the main cell of the brain, the center of one heart, if an
individual has these), idealize it to be point-like, and consider its rest frame.10 The
success of this project hinges on the naturalness of the choice for an individual’s frame
of reference. Since I am skeptical about one frame of reference being more natural than
another, I will sketch the other option: an individual’s thickness is frame-dependent
and no frame is distinguished.11
To put aside issues inessential for special relativistic characterization of individuals
(but otherwise highly important), let us assume that an individual has no holes, that it
is clear-cut where its/his/her spatial boundaries are (with respect to a given frame of
reference), that it/he/she begins in one point event and its/his/her each possible end
occurs at a point event. Given these assumptions,we may visualize an individual’s
possible life as a spatiotemporal “time-like” worm, of varying thickness, its beginning
and its end being point events. To characterize such objects we need to turn to a par-
ticular class of BST models, called “Minkowskian Branching Structures” (MBS’s), in
which histories are isomorphic to Minkowski spacetime. For details, see Placek and
Belnap (2010).12
To construct an MBS, one starts with a set P of physical properties (like strengths
of the electromagnetic field) attributable to points in R4. To handle alternative
10 A yet another option is to pick what physicists call “the rest frame of a compound object”, i.e., the frame
of reference in which the average momentum of the object’s components is zero.
11 For a suggestion of another option, of defining individuals in terms of causally understood transitions,
see Sect. 3 of Müller (2010).
12 The construction of MBS’s harks back to Belnap’s (1992) remark; MBS’s were then (incorrectly) defined
in Placek (2000). Müller (2002) had a correct construction, but with finististic assumptions, which later
Wron´ski and Placek (2009) removed by accepting a (non-intuitive) postulate. Recently Placek and Belnap
(2010) derived MBS’s from postulates inspired by field-theoretical considerations.
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possibilities, a set  of possible “scenarios” is postulated; an attribution function F
assigns then physical properties (elements of P) to scenario-point pairs, i.e., elements
of  × R4. Thus, an MBS is a triple M = 〈, F, P〉 subject to some postulates. The
postulates permit one to define an equivalence relation ≡ on ×R4, with 〈σ x〉 ≡ 〈ηy〉
meaning: x = y and x does not lie in the past-light cone of any point from which on
two scenarios σ and η qualitatively diverge.
The result of this construction is that, first, elements of a base set W (which con-
stitute Our World W = 〈W,〉) are equivalence classes [σ x] := {〈σ ′x ′〉 ∈  × R4 |
〈σ ′x ′〉 ≡ 〈σ x〉}. The ordering  is defined as 〈σ ′x ′〉  〈σ x〉 iff x ′ ≤ x and 〈σ ′x ′〉 ≡
〈σ x ′〉. Second, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of histories in
W and the set of sets of the form bσ := {[σ x] | x ∈ R4}, where σ ∈ . And,
most importantly for our task, the model has a numerical aspect, as each event [σ x]
has coordinates x ∈ R4. How should one understand these numbers? As expected,
these are spatiotemporal coordinates of possible events in a given frame of refer-
ence. In contrast to special relativity, however, the coordinates are not assigned to
events from one history only, but to all events that were, are, or will ever be, possi-
ble. Thus, a given MBS, with the inherent values of real numbers, depicts a world,
in its spatiotemporal and modal aspects, from within a given frame of reference.
How can one obtain a representation of the same world, but from another frame of
reference? The answer is standard: to obtain an MBS depicting the same situation
as that of an initial MBS, but from a different frame of reference, apply Lorentz
transformation to the “numerical” part of the initial model. That is, if e = [σ x] is
an event as represented in an initial model associated with one frame of reference,
then this event as represented in a model associated with another frame of refer-
ences is e′ = [σ Lx], where L is a Lorentz transformation between the two frames.
In this way, an individual as represented in a model associated with one frame of
reference, is related to its representations in other models associated with different
frames of reference. One can then define a (non-relative) individual as a class of
frame-relative representations, every two of which are related by a certain Lorentz
transformation.
Having explained frame-dependence, let us return to a question how to define a spa-
tially extended (frame-dependent) representation of an individual in an MBS model.
Before branching enters the stage, one needs to generalize the concept of time-or-
light-like path, i.e, a path in R4, whose every two points are time-like or light-like,
to a “time-like” worm or tunnel (a region in R × R3) with varying in time spatial
extension. Given our simplifying assumptions that an individual begins at a point
events and each possible end of it occurs at a point event as well, the generalization
is easy to accomplish. One needs to capture a concept of a region between two time-
or-light-like paths joining the top point with the bottom point. This exercise in the
calculus should not concern us here: we simply assume that there is a concept gen-
eralizing time-or-light-like paths to time-like worms whose spatial extension vary in
time, and that begin and end at points. We will call these regions of R × R3: “good
worms”.
Then a representation of an individual in an MBS (that is, an individual as repre-
sented in a given frame of reference) can be defined as follows:
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Definition 2 (MBS representation of an individual) Let M = 〈, F, P〉 be an MBS,
which determines BST model W = 〈W,〉, where W := {[σ x] | σ ∈ , x ∈ R4}
and the ordering  is defined as 〈σ ′x ′〉  〈x ′, σ 〉 iff x ′ ≤ x and 〈σ ′x ′〉 ≡ 〈σ x ′〉.
If A represents an individual in M, then
1. A ⊆ W ;
2. A has a proper infimum, i.e., ∃e ∈ A∀e′ ∈ A e  e′;
3. for every σ ∈ : bσ ∩ A = ∅ or bσ ∩ A = {[σ x] | x ∈ w ⊆ R × R3} for some
good worm w, where bσ = {[σ x] | x ∈ R4} for σ ∈ .
4 Lewis’s objections
The concept of branching individuals is non-intuitive—at least at first glance. After
all, despite the diverse possibilities which stood open before him, Frege left for Bad
Kleinen and died there on 26 July 1925. Indeed, Frege did not branch himself off.
If so, then what are we talking about when we utter the words “a part of Frege con-
tained in a possibility that was not realized”? The most prominent objection with
regards to branching individuals originates with Lewis (1986a, p. 199). The hero of
this conundrum is Hubert Humphrey, the Vice President of the USA in 1965–1969:
He could have had six fingers on his left hand. There is some other world that
so represents him. We are supposing now that representation de re works by
trans-world identity. So, Humphrey, who is a part of this world and here has
five fingers on the left hand, is also a part of some other world and there has six
fingers on his left hand. Qua part of this world he has five fingers, qua part of that
world he has six. He himself—one and the same and altogether self-identical—
has five fingers on the left hand, and he has not five, but six. How can this be?
How can we analyse such a concept—Hubert Humphrey had five fingers on his
left hand but he could have had six? The theoretician of branching individuals would
express it thusly: in one history, Hubert Humphrey has five fingers on his left hand,
while in some other history he has six fingers on his left hand. Yet how is this possible?
Let us show first that Lewis’ objection is not of logical nature, i.e., the concept of
branching individuals does not lead to contradictions and the semantic of the branch-
ing model is shaped in such a way as to be capable of dealing with branches. However,
in order to initiate an analysis of the Humphrey case in branching theory, we must, in
accordance with these theories, interpret the following modal sentence: “Humphrey
could have had six fingers on his left hand”. We therefore assume that this assertion
refers to a real possibility. In other words, at a certain embryonic stage of Humphrey’s
development, it was really possible that a sixth finger would grow on his left hand.
We will do an analysis in the framework of BT theory because it is simpler. The
primary semantic idea, drawn on Prior, pertains to evaluation of sentences—a point
of evaluation is delineated by two parameters: the event e and history h wherein we
assume that e ∈ h. Event-history pairs which fulfill this condition will be noted as
e/h. From a logical perspective, Lewis’ objection amount to asking whether there is
such an evaluation point e/h at which both the sentences are true. That is:
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e/h |= Hubert Humphrey (now) has five fingers on his left hand,
as well as
e/h |= Hubert Humphrey (now) has six fingers on his left hand.
For simplicity’s sake, we assume that there is some last event e∗ as of which it is
not yet predetermined that Hubert Humphrey will have five or six fingers on his left
hand. That is, we assume that in history h1 (after e∗ but before some final event e1 in
his life) Humphrey has five fingers, while in h2 (after e∗ but before some final event e2
in his life) he has six. If so, then the situation described in Lewis’ conundrum obtains
this interpretation:
For e ∈ h1 ∩ h2 such that e  e∗, h ∈ {h1, h2}:
e/h |= Hubert Humphrey (now) has neither five, nor six fingers on his left hand.
For e ∈ h1 such that e∗ < e < e1:
e/h1 |= Hubert Humphrey (now) has five and not six fingers on his left hand.
For e ∈ h2 such that e∗ < e < e2:
e/h2 |= Hubert Humphrey (now) has six and not five fingers on his left hand.
There is no obstacle to implement these requirements in a BT model. To state
things bluntly, in constructing a semantic model for this Humphrey story, we will take
care to preclude that at some valuation point e/h the two sentences “Humphrey has
five fingers on his left hand” and “Humphrey has six fingers on his left hand” were
true. The Lewis objection does not, therefore, demonstrate any contradiction or some
other logical problem resulting from the concept of branching individuals. (For an
exposition of BT semantics, see e.g. Belnap et al. 2001, Chap. 8.)
This objection does, however, touch upon a metaphysical problem: how should
the image of branching individuals be understood? Lewis appears to be saying that it
cannot be because it is absurd. To address this objection, we need to reflect on how
BT/BST models should be understood, and draw a distinction between the external
standpoint versus internal standpoint (cf. Belnap 2011).
From the external perspective, a branching model contains a plethora of possi-
bilities, all on par, with no distinction between possible and actual. It is somewhat
similar to the physicist’s study of the possible evolutions of a given system; the study
does not ask which of these possible evolutions the system actually travels. This is
a “scientific view” or “a view from nowhere”. If asked, from this standpoint, what
an individual is, we get a picture of a bundle of the individual’s alternative possible
lives, and since the distinction “actual versus possible” is not available on the external
perspective, there is no way to introduce the actual life of an individual. Further, since
the external standpoint does not distinguish the past, present, or future, it is incapable
of expressing things like “this option was once possible for an individual; it is now
impossible, though now the individual has such-and-such alternative future possibil-
ities”. As a result, from the external standpoint, we get an alien representation of an
individual. After all, Frege had one actual life, and although at his various phases he
faced alternative possible options of how to carry on, later these options ceased to be
possible.
To use the internal perspective, we need to ask, where a theoretician/an epistemic
subject/an agent is to be located? No doubt, he/she is intertwined with a net of causally
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active events and processes, and is in various spatiotemporal relations to other things.
A theoretician/an epistemic subject/an agent is a dweller of our world, and if our world
contains real possibilities, he or she is a dweller of our branching world. So, how do
I, as a theoretician located in a branching world, describe individuals, say, myself or
Frege? Here is what I shall do. First, perhaps after consulting my watch and a GPS
device, I turn to an adequate BST model, point at a certain event e in the model and
declare “here it is me now”. That particular event fixes my actual past (with respect to
this event). This involves ascertaining as settled all truths about my past. In my actual
past there are also some chancy events from which on my life could have gone differ-
ently. These events point to possibilities that were once open. Such chancy events in
the past of e permit one to evaluate as true at e sentences of the form: “I might have
…, but I did not”. In contrast, some chancy events after e determine as true or false at
e sentences of the form “It is (not) possible that I will …”. Needless to say, in order
for a theoretician to ascertain such sentences, his or her knowledge concerning both
actualities and real possibilities should be god-like. Still, it is knowledge from a given
standpoint, being located at a certain event, and having a given past.
Importantly, all sentences of our object language need to be evaluated from the
internal standpoint. To evaluate sentences like “It was the case that ϕ”, or “It is settled
that ϕ”, etc., we need to locate events of utterance in the model, that is, events at which
these sentences where uttered, and which are their “contexts of use”. However, there
are sentences, formulated in a meta-language, that call for using a BST model from
the external standpoint. To give an example, the question whether some two histories
are isomorphic, requires the external perspective for its evaluation.13
Lewis’ objection that branching individuals appear absurd has some substance if
considered from the external standpoint. This objection, however, is overturned if
interpreted from the internal standpoint. For branching theory the concept of index-
ically-given modalities and tenses is essential.
5 In lieu of a conclusion: unfinished business
Haunted by a vague and indistinguishable hunch, I feel that even if I have persuaded the
reader to accept the internal standpoint, I have not won over those persons who were
not already convinced of branching individuals. I believe that a part of the problem is
how to comprehend a multitude of possible histories. At the semantic level, there is no
problem: histories provide values for one of the parameters composing an evaluation
point for formulas— in much the same way as sequences of elements of a domain
provide values for the assignment parameter in the definition of truth by satisfaction.
As Belnap et al. (2001) say, just as it makes no sense to ask about a distinguished value
assignment so, too, it makes no sense to ask about a distinguished history.14
Notwithstanding the above, how should we understand the metaphysics of a multi-
tude of possible histories? As I see it, the problem stems from the concept of possible
13 I owe this example to T. Müller.
14 The concept of double-time reference further permits the analysis of speech acts in the framework of
branching theories (Belnap 2001).
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history: histories are simply too global. Our intuitions are better tailored to a local
concept of possible continuations of events. A theory of modalities and tenses that
works in terms of possible continuations rather than possible histories is developed
in Placek (2011). However, what the concept of an individual is in a local theory of
possible continuations—remains a task for future research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix: The axioms of BT and of BST
Definition 3 (model of BT) A model of BT is a pair 〈W,〉, where W = ∅ and  a
partial ordering on W , that satisfies these conditions:
1. if e1  e3 and e2  e3, then (e1  e2 or e2  e1): no backwards branching;
2. for all e1, e2 ∈ W there is e3 such that e3  e1 and e3  e2: historical connection.
Histories are defined as maximal chains in 〈W,〉.
In some models of BT one may define the concept of instants, which boils down
to introducing an equivalence relation I on W that respects the ordering . That is,
writing [e]I for the class of events equivalent to e ∈ W with respect to I , we require
that (1) for every history h in 〈W,〉 and every e ∈ W , the intersection h ∩ [e]I con-
tains exactly one element and (2) for all equivalence classes [e]I , [e′]I and all histories
h1, h2: [e]I ∩ h1 = [e′]I ∩ h1 iff [e]I ∩ h2 = [e′]I ∩ h2, and analogously for <.
Definition 4 (model of BST) W = 〈W,〉, where W = ∅ and  is a partial ordering
on W is a model of BST iff
1.  is dense on W;
2. W has no maximal elements;
3. Every lower bounded chain in W has an infimum;
4. Every upper bounded chain in W has a supremum in every history that it is a subset
of;
5. For every lower bounded chain O ⊆ h1/h2 there is e ∈ W such that e is maximal
in the intersection h1 ∩ h2 and ∀e′ ∈ O : e < e′.
Histories are defined as maximal upward-directed subsets of W . For e1, e2 ∈ W , we
say that e1 and e2 are space-like related (e1 SLR e2) iff ∃h ∈ Hist : e1, e2 ∈ h but
e1  e2 and e2  e1.
In general BST does not permit defining instants (temporal moments) or spatial
locations of events. In some models, however, one may introduce spatiotemporal
locations, understood as spatiotemporal points at which events occur. In such models
one defines the relation S, corresponding to the intuitive concept “possible events from
different histories occur at the same spatiotemporal point”. S should be an equivalence
relation on W and satisfy these conditions:
(1) for every history h in W and every e ∈ W , the intersection h ∩ [e]S contains
exactly one element, and
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(2) S respects the ordering : for all equivalence classes [e]S and [e′]S and all histo-
ries h1 and h2: [e]s ∩ h1 = [e′]S ∩ h1 iff [e]s ∩ h2 = [e′]S ∩ h2, and analogously
for < and SLR.
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